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Publication of children’s images, privacy and
Article 8: judgment in the matter of 
An Application by JR38 for Judicial Review




Identified as contemporary ‘folk devils’,1 children who are allegedly involved in riotingand disorder at interface areas in Northern Ireland have become the targets of
stereotypical media portrayals.2 Ongoing issues relating to the legacy of  over 30 years of
conflict in Northern Ireland include contestation of  space, the formal and informal
policing of  children and young people, and the persistence of  paramilitary punishment
attacks.3 This context raises significant issues in relation to children’s rights. One
contentious formal policing response to disorder, described as ‘the worst rioting in
years’,4 was publication by the the Police Service of  Northern Ireland (PSNI) of  the
images of  children and young people whom they wanted to question, under the code
name Operation Exposure.5 The images had been captured on closed-circuit television
(CCTV) during incidents of  interface violence in the summer of  2010. This policing
tactic became the subject of  protracted legal proceedings. 
As a result of  the internal circulation of  CCTV within the PSNI, a 14-year-old boy
referred to as JR38, who had a previous caution for riotous behaviour, was arrested on
1 July 2010. Following arrest, JR38 did accept that the CCTV placed him at the interface,
but it did not show him engaging in criminal activity. The applicant submitted an
application for judicial review in relation to the PSNI’s decision to release the images to
the local media and their publication in a leaflet, on the single ground that ‘the use of  . . .
Operation Exposure to identify and highlight children and young persons involved in
criminal activity as part of  a name and shame policy without due process is in breach of
the applicant’s rights pursuant to Article 8 of  the European Convention on Human
NILQ summer 2016
1     Stan Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of  the Mods and Rockers (Martin Robertson 1972).
2     Faith Gordon, A Critical Analysis of  the Print Media’s Representation of  Children and Young People during Transition
from Conflict in Northern Ireland (Queen’s University Belfast 2012).
3     Northern Ireland NGO Alternative Report, Submission to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of  the Child for
Consideration during the Committee’s Examination of  the United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Government Report (Children’s Law Centre and Save the Children NI 2015). 
4     New York Times (13 July 2010). In April 2010, the devolution of  policing and justice powers saw decision-
making on criminal justice policies and practices return to the Northern Ireland Assembly, following a period
of  38 years of  direct rule on these matters by the UK government. During the riots in the summer of  2010,
pressure was placed on the PSNI and the new Justice Minister to respond to the escalating disorder.
5     PSNI, Operation Exposure Leaflet (PSNI 2010). The PSNI in Derry/Londonderry printed and distributed
35,000 leaflets in August 2010. The leaflets contained 21 numbered images of  23 children and young people
to whom the PSNI wanted to speak regarding sectarian disorder.
Rights’ (ECHR).6 In September 2010, Treacy J in the High Court granted leave for a
judicial review application. In March 2013, the Divisional Court (Morgan LCJ, Higgins
and Coghlin LLJ) dismissed the application and concluded that any interference with the
applicant’s rights was necessary for the administration of  justice, the prevention of
disorder and crime and to protect society, within the meaning of  Article 8(2) of  the
ECHR.7 Following an appeal, on 1 July 2015, the Supreme Court gave its judgment in the
matter of  JR38.8
The appeal to the Supreme Court considered two core legal issues. Firstly, did the
publication of  the image amount to an interference with the appellant’s right to respect
for a private life under Article 8 of  the ECHR and, secondly, if  there was an interference,
was it justified? The respondent argued that the appellant could not be said to have any
reasonable expectation of  privacy where he had willingly engaged in acts of  disorder in
public.9 Counsel for the appellant submitted that reasonable expectation of  privacy was
not in general a prerequisite for engagement of  Article 8 and particularly not in the case
of  a child or young person. Counsel for the appellant suggested that, while reasonable
expectation was a factor that could be taken into account, it should not be treated as
determinative of  the issue of  whether Article 8 was engaged.10
There was disagreement between the justices on the first issue of  whether the
appellant’s Article 8 rights were engaged. The question which divided the justices was
whether Article 8 is only engaged where the alleged victim has a legitimate expectation of
privacy or a reasonable expectation of  protection and respect for his private life.11 Three
justices (Lord Toulson, Lord Clarke and Lord Hodge) felt that, because the appellant was
engaged in criminal activity in a public place when his image was captured, he could not
have a reasonable expectation of  privacy and that this was ‘the touchstone’ of  whether
Article 8 was engaged. 
Lord Toulson, with whom Lord Clarke and Lord Hodge were in agreement, referred to
several matters outlined by the Strasbourg Court in Von Hannover v Germany,12 including the
purpose of  Article 8, what it seeks to protect, and the need to examine the particular
circumstances of  the case in order to decide whether the applicant had a legitimate
expectation of  protection.13 In particular, Lord Toulson was concerned with one of  the
qualifications set out by Laws LJ in R (Wood) v Commissioner of  Police of  the Metropolis,14
namely the touchstone of  whether the claimant enjoyed on the facts a ‘reasonable
expectation of  privacy’ or ‘legitimate expectation of  protection’.15 Lord Toulson also
referred to Sir Anthony Clarke MR in Murray v Express Newspapers plc16 and his application
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6     Case Re JR38 Application [2013] NIQB 44, paras 1, 16–21. Article 8 of  the ECHR states: ‘(1) Everyone has the
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence; (2) There shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of  this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of  . . . public safety . . . for the prevention of  disorder
or crime.’
7     Re JR38 (n 6) para 38.
8     [2015] UKSC 42.
9     Ibid judgment para 33.
10   Ibid.
11   Ibid para 105. Lord Toulson took the expressions to be synonymous. 
12   (2004) 16 BHRC 545.
13   Supreme Court judgment (n 8) para 85.
14   [2009] EWCA Civ 414, [2010] 1 WLR 12.
15   Supreme Court judgment (n 8) para 87.
16   [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481, para 35.
of  Campbell v MGN Ltd,17 which indicated that the question of  whether there is a
reasonable expectation of  privacy is a broad one and must take into account all of  the
circumstances of  the case.18 Lord Toulson was of  the opinion that the fact that the
applicant was a child at the time was not a reason for departing from the test of  whether
there was a reasonable or legitimate expectation of  privacy, though he conceded that it was
a potentially relevant factor.19 In his opinion, the present case was on all fours with Kinloch
v HM Advocate,20 in which Lord Hope argued that ‘[t]he criminal nature of  what he was
doing . . . was not an aspect of  his private life that he was entitled to keep private’.21 Lord
Toulson concluded that the protected zone of  interaction between a person and others was
not interaction in the form of  a riot and that the ‘reasonable’ or ‘legitimate expectation’ test
was an objective test, to be applied broadly, taking into account all of  the circumstances of
the case22 and having regard to the underlying value or values to be protected. 
In contrast, two of  the justices, Lord Kerr with whom Lord Wilson was in agreement,
considered that other factors such as criminalisation of  the appellant, the risk of
stigmatisation, the lack of  consent and how widely his image had been circulated in local
newspapers were relevant.23 In their view, Article 8 was engaged. In examining the
Strasbourg jurisprudence on engagement of  Article 8, Lord Kerr concluded that a
nuanced approach was needed to reach a conclusion on this issue.24 He stated that
engagement of  the right must cover a wide field of  an individual’s activity and that the
scope of  application must vary according to the conditions in which it is invoked and the
circumstances of  the individual.25 In particular, the judgment in PG and JH v UK26
illustrated that an unduly rigorous use of  the reasonable expectation test is impossible to
reconcile with the breadth of  possible application of  Article 8 and that the reasonable
expectation of  privacy was not the sole test of  whether Article 8 is engaged.27 In the
situation where someone was engaged in activities such as public disorder, which were
liable to be reported or recorded, what is reasonable to expect as to protection of  her/his
privacy is a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether Article 8 is engaged, but
it will not automatically determine the issue.28 Lord Kerr concluded that to make the
‘reasonable expectation of  privacy’ an inflexible and wholly determinative test would be
to fundamentally misunderstand the proper approach to the application of  Article 8 and
would unjustifiably limit its possible scope.29
On the second of  the core issues, the appellant took no issue with the respondent’s
assertion that the interference with his Article 8 right pursued a legitimate aim. However,
counsel for the appellant claimed that it was not in accordance with law and was not
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17   [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457.
18   Supreme Court judgment (n 8) para 88; circumstances included the attributes of  the claimant, the nature of
the activity in which the claimant has been involved, the place where it has happened and the nature and
purpose of  the intrusion.
19   Ibid para 95.
20   [2012] UKSC62, [2013] 2 AC93.
21   With which the other members of  the court agreed.
22   Reaffirming Sir Anthony Clarke’s opinion in Murray (n 16).
23   As affirmed in Reklos v Greece (2009) 27 BHRC 420.
24   Ibid para 55.
25   Ibid para 36.
26   (2001) 46 EHRR 1272
27   Supreme Court judgment (n 8) para 38.
28   Ibid para 39.
29   Ibid para 56.
necessary in a democratic society.30 All of  the justices were agreed that the interface
rioting, which was dangerous and unpleasant for residents living in the areas, had to be
brought to an end and that it was important that the young people were discouraged from
being involved.31 The justices noted that the police had made extensive efforts to identify
the individuals before deciding that the images should be published and, therefore, the
interference was justified.32 The Supreme Court therefore unanimously dismissed the
appeal.33 The Lords agreed that, if  there had been an interference with the appellant’s
Article 8 right, it was necessary for the administration of  justice. 
The Supreme Court’s judgment is illuminating in further demonstrating the limits of
privacy, particularly in the exercise of  balancing the right to a private life and other
specific societal values. Lord Clarke made reference to Lord Steyn’s famous phrase, ‘in
law, context is everything’,34 and in this case it appears that context was relevant not only
in the court’s consideration of  whether an interference was justified, but also in their
determination of  the first question relating to engagement.35 The decision is based on a
very one-dimensional view of  Article 8, in the sense of  it being a privacy right only.36
This is evident in the assertion that the touchstone for the engagement of  Article 8 is
whether the claimant enjoys on the facts a ‘reasonable expectation of  privacy’.37 It is
likely, however, that this case will become a leading authority on the context where
Article 8 can be engaged by the publication of  photographs. In this connection, it is
interesting that none of  the justices refer to Weller and Others v Associated Newspapers Ltd,38
which also involved the publication of  photographs of  children taken in a public place.
The Court of  Appeal’s decision in Weller39 was in line with the focus on children’s rights
as set out in Murray v Express Newspapers,40 which confirmed that intrusions on the right
to privacy must be demonstrably justifiable and that the threshold would be particularly
stringent in the case of  children. Similarly, the rights of  children have been of  paramount
importance and have been protected by the courts in recent cases, such as in the Supreme
Court’s decision in PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd.41
Responses from the children’s rights sector in Northern Ireland have criticised the
judgment for not being consistent with the UN Convention on the Rights of  the Child
(UNCRC)42 and it is somewhat surprising that Lord Kerr is the only justice to engage
with international instruments such as the UNCRC and the Beijing Rules.43 At the 72nd
session of  the Committee on the Rights of  the Child on 23 May 2016, the UN Committee
made direct reference to the PSNI’s Operation Exposure and asked for commitments that
police policy in the future would not ‘name and shame’ children. This is particularly
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30   Ibid para 68.
31   Ibid para 77.
32   Ibid paras 76–77.
33   Released on 1 July 2015.
34   R v Secretary of  State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] UKHL 26, para 28.
35   Supreme Court judgment (n 8) para 114.
36   Article 8 of  the ECHR is a broad-ranging right and also includes the right to respect for her/his family life,
home and correspondence. 
37   Supreme Court judgment (n 8) para 105.
38   [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB).
39   [2015] EWCA Civ 1176.
40   [2008] EWCA Civ 446.
41   [2016] UKSC 26.
42   See, for example, <www.niccy.org/media/1653/niccy-ezine-operation-exposure-jr38–2015-uksc-42-oct-
15.pdf>.
43   Supreme Court judgment (n 8) 49–52.
significant in instances of  mistaken identity and subsequent labelling and stigmatisation,
such as in a recent example of  an error made by East Cambridgeshire police in England,
which saw the distribution of  CCTV images of  two children, wrongly accusing them of
theft from a local store.44 This demonstrated the far-reaching consequences of  police
tactics breaching children’s rights. This issue remains live and it is concerning that this
judgment may be raised in future cases as a demonstration of  a new threshold. 
Case notes
44   See ‘Police Apologise for Picturing the Wrong Girls in Theft CCTV Footage’ Daily Express (London, 23 May
2016).
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